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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 14, 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
entered the debate over whether religious landlords have a constitu-
tional right to discriminate against unmarried cohabitants in Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission.1  The plaintiffs in Thomas
brought an action against the State of Alaska and the City of Anchor-
age, claiming that the inclusion of 'marital status' as a protected class
in both the state law2 and a city ordinance against discrimination' vio-
lated the plaintiffs' First Amendment right to the free exercise of
religion.4
Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker, both devout Christians, were
residents of Anchorage, Alaska, and were the owners of various rental
properties in the Anchorage area.' Thomas and Baker filed suit to
enjoin the state and city from enforcing the antidiscrimination laws
against them.6 They claimed that they had, in the past, violated the
laws, and would continue to do so in the future. Thomas and Baker
believe that unmarried couples living together commit the sin of forni-
cation. Thus, they believe that by allowing fornication on their rental
properties, they too would commit sin.7 They contended, therefore,
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., University of Washington.
1. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999).
2. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240(1) (1999) provides: "It is unlawful ... (1) to refuse to sell,
lease, or rent ... to a person because of... marital status."
3. ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE § 5.20.020(A) (1999) provides: "[I]t is unlaw-
ful ... to ... [r]efuse to sell, lease, or rent ... to a person because of... marital status."
4. Id.
5. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 696.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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that enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws against them violated
their constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.'
The district court agreed with Thomas and Baker, and, acting
under the Religious Freedom Reformation Act9 (RFRA), found that
enforcement of the statutes did violate the plaintiffs' First Amend-
ment rights. ° On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue under
a different standard because the United States Supreme Court had, in
the meantime, declared RFRA unconstitutional." Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit was left to determine the validity of the plaintiffs'
claims under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 2
Despite the change in controlling law, the Ninth Circuit still found in
favor of the plaintiffs by relying on the "hybrid rights"' 3 language of
Smith.
If allowed to stand, the ramifications of this ruling will extend far
beyond the scope of the religious landlord/unmarried cohabitant
issue." Under Thomas, religious objectors to any law can invoke strict
scrutiny analysis simply by adding additional constitutional claims to
their religious complaints.' As long as those other claims are "color-
able," the state must then satisfy strict scrutiny, justifying the chal-
lenged law by showing a compelling government interest in achieving
the law's effect. 6 Furthermore, the state must show that the law is
narrowly tailored to achieve that government interest. 7 This rigorous
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993)
(declared unconstitutional 1997). "RFRA" prohibit[ed] "[g]overnment" from "substantially
burden[ing]" a person's exercise of religion "even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability unless," the government can demonstrate the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest." Id. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16
(1997).
10. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 697.
11. "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has
been given the power to enforce, not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
12. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
13. Id. at 882. The notion of hybrid rights is a product of Justice Scalia's Smith opinion.
The basic theory is that plaintiffs can combine free exercise claims with other constitutional
claims such as free speech or Takings Clause rights. By implicating other constitutional rights,
the plaintiffs can force the state or municipality to justify the challenged laws under a stricter
standard.
14. The Ninth Circuit has withdrawn the original Thomas decision and reheard the case en
banc in October 1999. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n., 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir.
1999). A new opinion is expected to be released in 2000.
15. Further discussion of this will follow below.
16. Thomas, 165 F.3dat 711-12.
17. Id. at 712.
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standard will render many state and local laws vulnerable to attack by
religious objectors. We will then live in a system in which different
rules exist for different people depending on how strongly each holds
to his or her religious beliefs.
The religious landlord/unmarried cohabitant debate has steadily
gained momentum since the 1970s, when states began to include the
term "marital status" in their antidiscrimination and fair housing laws.
As of this writing, twenty-two states include "marital status" as a pro-
tected class in their antidiscrimination and fair housing laws." How-
ever, Connecticut and Oregon explicitly bar protection of unmarried
cohabitants in their definitions of marital status." The remaining
twenty states include marital status as a protected class, but none of
them explicitly include unmarried cohabitants in the definition of
marital status.2" Thus, the debate materializes." Are unmarried
cohabitants a protected class within the meaning of the general prohi-
bitions against marital status discrimination? The question is further
complicated by the issue of whether individuals with sincerely held
religious beliefs are constitutionally exempted from compliance with
these laws because the laws interfere with their free exercise of reli-
gion.
Because the Ninth Circuit, in reaching its Thomas decision, relied
on Smith's hybrid rights language, this Note will focus on the court's
analysis of that subject. By applying the hybrid rights' dicta instead of
following the actual holding in Smith, the Ninth Circuit reached a
conclusion that is illogical and does not comport with current Supreme
Court free exercise jurisprudence. This Note will discuss the Thomas
18. Michael V. Hernandez, The Rights of Religious Landlords to Exclude Unmarried Cohabi-
tants: Debunking the Myth of the Tenants' "New Clothes," 77 NEB. L. REV. 494, 502 (1998).
19. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c(b)(2) (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033(6)
(1999).
20. Hernandez, supra note 18, at 502.
21. There are several issues that have been discussed as possible solutions to the religious
landlord/unmarried cohabitant problem, but most are well beyond the scope of this article. For
instance, some courts and commentators have narrowed the question to whether the challenged
statutes proscribe religious conduct or religious belief. While the reader should be aware that
other issues exist, one need not be concerned with them for the purposes of this Note. For a gen-
eral discussion about the religious landlord/unmarried cohabitant debate, see Maureen E. Mar-
key, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487
(1997); Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's Right
to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1995); Hernandez,
supra note 18; John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for
the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415 (1990-1991); Melissa Fishman
Cordish, Comment, A Proposal for the Reconciliation of Free Exercise Rights and Anti-Discrimina-
tion Law, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2113 (1996). See generally Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1156-59
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
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court's analysis and will propose a logical interpretation of Smith that
more closely reflects the Supreme Court's actual position regarding the
Free Exercise Clause.22
II. FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Pre-Smith
To fully understand the hybrid rights controversy, one must first
gain a brief understanding of the tumultuous history of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]."23
The first major case to discuss the language of the First Amend-
ment 24 was Reynolds v. United States25 in 1878. Reynolds involved a
criminal appeal from the United States Territory of Utah on the
defendant's conviction for criminal bigamy.26 The defendant claimed
an exemption from the law based on his religious beliefs as a member
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, also known as the
Church of Mormon. 27 After a brief discussion of the First Amend-
ment's applicability to a United States Territory, the Court inquired
28as to what the religious freedom guarantee really guarantees.
Chief Justice Waite, writing for the Court, concluded that "Con-
gress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order., 29 He went on to state that to allow a reli-
gious objector an exemption, "would be to make the professed doc-
trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."3 The Reynolds
rule dominated free exercise jurisprudence for over 80 years.
Reynolds controlled free exercise jurisprudence until the Supreme
Court reversed field in the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner.31 Sherbert in-
volved a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who, because
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I. States are bound by the Free Exercise Clause by virtue of its
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
24. At least the first since its incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.
25. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
26. Id. at 146.
27. Id. at 161.
28. Id. at 162.
29. Id. at 164.
30. Id. at 167.
31. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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of religious conviction, was unavailable for work on Saturdays, the
Sabbath Day of her faith.32 The religious objector in Sherbert was
unable to find work because all of the mills in the area required a six-
day work week.33 She was then denied unemployment benefits by the
State of South Carolina because the State determined that she was not
"available" for work, a prerequisite for benefits.34
The Supreme Court concluded that "to condition the availability
of benefits upon the appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal prin-
cipal of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her
constitutional liberties."35 Thus, the Court held that any burden on
the free exercise of religion must be justified by a "compelling state
interest,"36 and that "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation."37 The Sher-
bert rationale set up a seemingly insurmountable burden on govern-
mental action when that action was confronted by religious objectors.
Applying the Sherbert rule in 1971, the Supreme Court held that
enforcement of Wisconsin's compulsory education law violated the
free exercise rights of religious objectors.38 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Old
Order Amish parents objected to a Wisconsin law that required chil-
dren to attend school until the age of 16." The Amish faith required
that children learn by "doing," and that they should avoid contact
with the outside world.4" The Court first balanced the interests of the
state against the burden the law placed on the objector's free exercise
rights.4 The Yoder Court then held that "only those interests of the
highest order ... can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion."42 Recognizing that the state did have a legitimate interest
in the education of its citizens, the Court still held that the state's
interest was not sufficiently compelling as against the objections of the
Amish parents.43 The importance of the Yoder decision may seem
elusive at this point, but, for reasons to be discussed below, Yoder is
the reason 'hybrid rights' entered the lexicon of free exercise jurispru-
dence.
32. Id. at 399.
33. Id. at 400.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 406.
36. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
37. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
38. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1971).
39. Id. at 207.
40. Id. at 211.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 215.
43. Id. at 215-29.
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As a further illustration of the Supreme Court's use of the Sher-
bert rule, in United States v. Lee, the Court reached a different result."
In Lee, the Court had before it a controversy involving a member of
the Old Order Amish who sued to recover his previously paid social
security taxes based on his religious opposition to nationalized wel-
fare.4" The Court balanced the interest of the government against the
burden on the religious objector and found that the government's
interest in the social security system was sufficiently compelling to
justify the burden on free exercise rights.46 The Court stated that
"[t]o maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom
to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield
to the common good. '"' The Yoder and Lee decisions represent the
two ways in which pre-Smith free exercise cases were resolved under
Sherbert's compelling state interest test.
B. Smith
In 1990, the Supreme Court once again reversed field in its free
exercise jurisprudence.4" The claimants in Smith were fired from their
jobs in a drug rehabilitation center after their ingestion of peyote dur-
ing a Native American Church ritual.49 They were then denied unem-
ployment benefits because the State claimed that they had been fired
for work-related "misconduct.""0  In an opinion written by Justice
Scalia, the Court declared, "[w]e have never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."'" Citing
Lee, the Court went on to claim that it had consistently held that "the
right of free exercise of religion does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes). '"'52 This language became
the holding of the Smith Court. 3
44. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
45. Id. at 254-55.
46. Id. at 261.
47. Id. at 259.
48. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
49. Id. at 874.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 878-79.
52. Id. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
53. If this holding had been applied literally to the Thomas case, the defendants would have
certainly prevailed. The antidiscrimination laws were neutral because they did not specifically
target religion and were generally applicable to every landlord in Alaska.
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After announcing his rule of law, Justice Scalia was still left to
deal with Sherbert and its progeny. 4 Between Sherbert in 1963, and
Smith in 1990, seventeen free exercise cases reached the Supreme
Court. Applying Sherbert's compelling interest test, the religious
objector lost to the government in thirteen of those cases." Of the
four cases remaining, three involved unemployment compensation
issues similar to those present in Sherbert.6 Having distinguished the
Smith facts from the previous unemployment compensation cases,
Justice Scalia was left with Yoder as the last standing Supreme Court
free exercise case invalidating enforcement of a neutral, generally
applicable law against religious objectors.57
Justice Scalia proclaimed, "[t]he only decisions in which we have
held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunc-
tion with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
and of the press. He went on to state that the Smith case did not
present such a "hybrid situation." 9 Thus, Justice Scalia was responsi-ble for the birth of the hybrid rights debate.
C. Post-Smith
In 1992, the Supreme Court applied its "neutral, generally appli-
cable" rule in a case involving a series of city ordinances effectively
outlawing the practices of members of the Santeria religion.6" Mem-
54. Smith was a sharply divided Court and, because Justice Scalia wrote for a majority of
five, some commentators have suggested that he did not have the votes to overturn Sherbert out-
right, and was left to distinguish it into submission. See generally Peter M. Stein, Case Note,
Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: Does the Right to Exclude, Combined with
Religious Freedom, Present a "Hybrid Situation" Under Employment Division v. Smith? 4 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 141 (1995); Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Prove-
nance and Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 833 (1993).
55. See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1458 (1992) (provides an account of not only Supreme Court
free exercise cases, but also lower court cases between Sherbert and Smith).
56. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); see also Hob-
bie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd.
of the Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
57. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
59. Id. at 882. In attempting to distinguish Sherbert and its progeny, Justice Scalia read
these cases as implicating other constitutional issues. Because his reading allowed him to claim
that these cases were decided on different grounds, he was free to ignore them as precedent. For
instance, Yoder involved the constitutional right to raise children. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia
stopped there. If he had explained further, the present controversy may not even exist.
60. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1992).
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bers of the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practice the Santeria relig-
ion, which includes ritual animal sacrifice as an important aspect of its
practice.6" In response, the City of Hialeah passed several ordinances
outlawing the killing of animals, calling the ordinances important to
the public health.6 2 The Church sued to enjoin the City from enforc-
ing the ordinances against it, claiming that the laws violated the Free
Exercise Clause.63
The Supreme Court, applying the Smith test, found that the laws
were neither neutral nor generally applicable for several reasons. First,
the Court determined that the laws were not facially neutral because
they specifically mentioned "sacrifice" and "ritual," and because one
of the ordinances claimed that the "residents and citizens of the City
of Hialeah have expressed concern that certain religions may propose
to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace
or safety."64 The Court further found that the laws were not neutral
based on their effect, declaring the laws an "impermissible attempt to
target petitioners and their religious practices. "65
Because the Court found that the ordinances were not neutral
and generally applicable, and were therefore unconstitutional, it did
not reach the question of the existence of "hybrid rights." However,
in his concurring opinion, Justice Souter attacked the notion of hybrid
rights, calling them "ultimately untenable."66 He went on to write,
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional
right is implicated, then the hybrid be so vast as to swallow the
Smith rule, and indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the
situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associa-
tional rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if
a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law
under another constitutional provision, then there would have
been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid
cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.67
Justice Souter recognized the fundamental flaw in the notion of hybrid
rights.
Justice Souter was not the only one who did not like the new
Smith rule. In fact, in response to Smith, Congress passed the Reli-
61. Id. at 524.
62. Id. at 527.
63. Id. at 528.
64. Id. at 535.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 567.
67. Id.
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gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).68 RFRA was enact-
ed to overrule Smith and return to the rule of Sherbert.69 RFRA
governed free exercise jurisprudence until 1997, when the Supreme
Court held the Act to be beyond the constitutional powers of Con-
gress.7" Holding that "[t]he stringent test RFRA demands of state
laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence between the
means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved, '71 the Court
returned free exercise jurisprudence to Smith's neutral, generally
applicable rule.
The stage was therefore set for the Ninth Circuit to render its
interpretation of this rule.
D. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission
Having presented a brief history of the rather tumultuous career
of the Free Exercise Clause, this Note will now turn to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's handling of the currently applicable rule defined by Smith. The
plaintiffs in Thomas objected to both state and local laws prohibiting
housing discrimination on the basis of marital status. Plaintiffs,
Thomas and Baker, claimed they had violated, and would continue to
violate the laws because of their strong religious beliefs.72 They
argued that, if the city enforced the laws against them by forcing them
to rent to unmarried couples, their First Amendment right to the free
exercise of religion would be violated.73 The defendants and the State
and local government contended that the laws were neutral and gener-
ally applicable and, therefore, not in violation of the First Amend-
ment.74
The court began with a cursory discussion of whether the con-
troversy was ripe for review.75 After determining that it was,76 the
court moved on to the Smith rule.77 Thomas and Baker insisted that
the laws were neither neutral nor generally applicable because, as in
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et. seq. (1990).
69. Id. "(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ... and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."
Id. at § 2000bb(b).
70. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
71. Id. at 533.
72. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 696-97.
73. Id. at 697.
74. Id. at 700-01.
75. Id. at 698-700.
76. There are serious questions about the accuracy of this finding, however. While these
issues are well beyond the scope of this Note, the reader may choose to examine them individu-
ally. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 718-21 (Hawkins, J., Dissenting).
77. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 700.
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Lukumi, the laws at issue contained exemptions for certain activities
proscribed by the laws.78 Specifically, Thomas and Baker pointed out
exceptions in the housing laws that allowed the "sale, lease or rental of
classes of real property commonly known as housing for 'singles' or'married couples' only."79 They also pointed to a provision allowing
an exemption for "individual home[s] wherein the renter or lessee
would share common living areas with the owner, lessor, manager,
agent, or other person."8" Because the laws allow exemptions in these
circumstances and not in the circumstance of religious objection,
Thomas and Baker claimed that the laws were constitutionally suspect
and should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.8
The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments, however, holding
that the underinclusiveness of the Alaskan laws claimed by Thomas
and Baker was of a "different constitutional order altogether" from
that claimed in Lukumi.82 While the laws drafted in Lukumi applied
only to members of the Santeria religion, the Alaskan laws applied to
all landlords.83 The court went on to state that the underinclusiveness
claimed by Thomas and Baker was not a "talisman of constitutional
infirmity," but was an indication of something more sinister,84 like the
laws in Lukumi.8" In Lukumi, the exemptions were patterned to
exclude the enforcement of the laws against everyone except members
of the Santeria religion. No such pattern existed in the Alaskan hous-
ing laws.86
The court finally held that there was no indication that the Alas-
kan laws were designed to target members of any religion.87 Also, the
court held that the "burden on religiously motivated conduct, even if
substantial," was "incidental."'8 Thus, the Ninth Circuit endorsed
the rule in Smith and determined that the Alaska laws were neutral
and generally applicable and, as such, were enforceable against Tho-
mas and Baker.89 If the court had ended its inquiry at this point, it
would have reached the correct outcome under Smith. However, in
the court's apparent zeal to return to Sherbert's strict scrutiny test, the
78. Id. at 701.
79. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240).
80. Id. (citing ANCHORAGE ALASKA MUN. CODE § 5.20.020).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 2 and 3.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 701-02.
86. Id. at 702.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Ninth Circuit qualified its neutral, generally applicable analysis by
stating that Smith only applies, "absent some other exception."9"
Thomas and Baker claimed that even if the laws were neutral and
generally applicable, the laws still failed to pass constitutional muster
because they fit within the hybrid rights exception outlined in Smith."
They claimed that even though the free exercise claim alone did not
invalidate the laws as enforced against them, the combination of
effects on their free exercise rights, free speech rights,92 and exclusion
rights93 gave rise to a constitutional hybrid.94 Claiming that the
Supreme Court had been "less than precise" in defining hybrid rights,
the Ninth Circuit set out to determine of what a hybrid right really
consists.9"
E. Thomas' Hybrid Rights Analysis
The court stated that before it could evaluate the merits of Tho-
mas' and Bakers' hybrid rights claim, it first needed to determine
whether such a right exists, and if so, what it might entail.96 However,
the court skipped the question of whether hybrid rights exist and
moved straight into an analysis of ways in which a hybrid may be
accomplished.97
The court cited several different ways in which a court could
handle a hybrid rights claim. First, it cited the First and District of
Columbia Circuits, both of which have determined that companion
rights9" must be independently viable constitutional claims in order to
be hybridized with the free exercise claim.99 For contrast, the Ninth
Circuit then pointed to the Tenth Circuit's interpretation, which
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The plaintiffs contended that the provision in the statute prohibiting discrimina-
tory language in rental advertisements was an unconstitutional infringement on their rights to
freedom of speech.
93. Thomas and Baker also contended that enforcement of the laws would have violated
their rights to exclude others from their property guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
94. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 702.
95. Id. at 703.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. "Companion rights" are those additional constitutional claims that plaintiffs attempt to
hybridize with a free exercise claim.
99. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703; EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,467 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (holding that there was a hybrid situation because the University had proven violation
of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause); see also Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and
Safer Products, 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs companion claim of
interference with family relations and parental prerogatives was not an "independently protected
constitutional protection").
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"requires only a 'colorable claim of infringement.""'1 " Finally, the
court alluded to the fact that the mere implication of another constitu-
tional claim may be enough to hybridize a Free Exercise claim. 101
However, one interpretation remained. The court next discussed
the Sixth Circuit's handling of hybrid rights.0 2 The Sixth Circuit held
that the notion of hybrid rights was illogical and that it would not
employ a test stricter than the Smith rule.'0 3 The Ninth Circuit dis-
missed the Sixth Circuit's analysis as ignoring the Supreme Court's
ruling.0 4 The Thomas court refused to "hypothesize about the Jus-
tices' 'true' intentions," and found that because the term "hybrid
rights" appears in the Supreme Court decision, it ends the discussion
about whether those rights exist.' °
The court was left to determine which of three methods of ana-
lyzing hybrid rights was the most appropriate: the implication stand-
ard, the colorable claim standard, or the independently viable
standard. Discussion of this issue began with the court quoting Jus-
tice Souter's concurring opinion from Lukumi."'0 Once again,
[i]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional
right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be
so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and indeed, the hybrid
exception would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since
free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in
the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant
would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral,
generally applicable law under another constitutional provision,
then there would have been no reason for the Court in what
Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise
Clause at all.' 7
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Justice Souter that neither the
implication standard nor the independently viable standard were
appropriate for analyzing hybrid rights claims.'0 8 The court correctly
100. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703 (quoting Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135
F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998)).
101. Id. at 703, n.7.
102. Id. at 704.
103. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
104. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704.
105. Id. at 705. "[Wie must take a judicial pronouncement at face value. We will not
speculate or hypothesize about the Justices' 'true' intentions; rather, we will assume that these
intentions are expressed in the words the Justices carefully chose to express the opinion of the
Court." Id.
106. Id. at 704.
107. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567.
108. This decision creates a further split within the circuits. Here the Ninth Circuit broke
from the First and District of Columbia Circuits, both of which applied the 'independently via-
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dismissed the implication standard because this standard would allow
a party to reach strict scrutiny on its free exercise claim merely by
including another claim within its pleadings."°9 Furthermore, the
court observed that previous cases, which the Supreme Court referred
to as hybrid cases, involved discussion of free exercise in conjunction
with other constitutional claims."' This indicates that the Supreme
Court did not intend hybrid cases to use an independently viable
standard."'
Having eliminated two of the three standards, the court settled
on the colorable claim standard as the one most appropriate for hybrid
rights analysis." 2 Although the court agreed with Justice Souter in his
impressions of the other two standards, the Ninth Circuit did not join
him in his conclusion that the entire notion of hybrid rights was"untenable.""' In an apparent zeal to reach Sherbert's strict scrutiny
rule, the court imposed a standard somewhere in the middle of the
other two extremes.
The court justified its decision to apply a colorable claim stand-
ard by reasoning that this standard does not engender the problems
inherent in the other two standards." 4 The court asserted that "an
individual claiming to be within the hybrid rights exception may not
rest upon a bald assertion ... [n]or, however, is he required to show
that the law he challenges is invalid under [another constitutional
claim] alone.""' By falling between these two problematic standards,
the Ninth Circuit claimed to have avoided the problems of these
extremes altogether and to have struck a balance that is neither, "too
lax nor too strict, but 'just right.""' 6
The court further justified its decision to use a colorable claim
standard by stating that it followed precedent set by the Tenth Cir-
cuit."7 Also, the Ninth Circuit referred to the use of the colorable
ble' method. See Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467; Brown, 68 F.3d at 539.
109. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705.
110. Id.
111. This is a rather curious statement, because the court then pointed out that it would
"not speculate or hypothesize about the Justices' 'true' intentions; rather, we will assume that
those intentions are expressed in the words the Justices carefully chose to express in the opinions
of the Court." Id. at 705. While this statement may not be tremendously curious in the discus-
sion of the 'independently viable' standard, it certainly is strange considering the fact that the
court's entire discussion of hybrid rights is speculation about the Justices' intentions.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. "Our colorable-claim standard is therefore neither too lax nor too strict, but 'just
right."' Id. at 707.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 707.
117. This argument is somewhat unavailing, however, because the Tenth Circuit never
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claim standard in other areas of the law, coming to the conclusion that
colorable claim means 'fair probability' or 'likelihood' of success on
the merits."'
With this standard freshly set out, the Ninth Circuit began an
inquiry into whether Thomas and Baker had established a colorable
claim implicating any of their companion rights. That is, was there a
fair probability or likelihood of success on the merits of either of the
plaintiffs' free speech rights or their exclusion rights claims?
The court determined that Thomas and Baker had established
colorable claims under the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech
Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause." 9 Having found
colorable claims, the court hybridized them with the free exercise
claim and determined that the case fit within Smith's hybrid rights
exception. 2 ' The court then applied Sherbert's strict scrutiny test and
found that the interest of the state and local governments in eradicat-
ing discrimination was not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
burden the laws placed on Thomas and Baker. 2' Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and invalidated enforcement
of the laws against religious objectors.'22
III. HYBRID RIGHTS: FACT OR FICTION
The Thomas opinion can be criticized on many different fronts.
For instance, there are issues involving the court's analysis of the ripe-
ness issue, the First and Fifth Amendment issues, and even the court's
strict scrutiny analysis.'23 However, this Note is concerned with the
Ninth Circuit's hybrid rights analysis. The court made several errors
in this analysis, and the combination of these errors led to a result that
does not fit within the true holding of Smith. How could the Ninth
Circuit realistically combine a losing free exercise claim with a losing
actually reached this question. "Whatever the Smith hybrid-rights theory may ultimately mean,
we believe that it at least requires a colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific
constitutional rights." Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th
Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
118. Besides quoting from Webster's Third New International Dictionary for a definition
of "colorable," the Thomas court mentioned areas of the law such as habeas corpus proceedings
and selective prosecution claims in which the Supreme Court has established a colorable stand-
ard. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705-06.
119. Id. at 717. There is some question as to whether the analysis by the court on these
topics is correct. See id. at 724-26 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 717.
122. Id. at 718.
123. Id. at 718-27. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hawkins covers all these areas in some
detail.
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takings claim and a losing free speech claim, and then come up with a
winning free exercise claim? Do three losers really make a winner?
The court's first priority in adjudicating these claims should have
been to conduct an independent analysis of whether or not a hybrid
rights exception really exists. Instead, the court seemed content to
claim that it was "not at liberty to ignore" previous hybrid rights cases
such as Yoder. 124 While characterizing the Sixth Circuit's view that
there is no logical interpretation of hybrid rights as "the path of least
resistance," the Ninth Circuit itself took the easier path by simply dis-
agreeing with the Sixth Circuit, dismissing that Circuit's conclusion,
and moving on. 12' The question remains, however: does a hybrid
rights exception really exist?
There are several issues regarding the existence of hybrid rights
that the Ninth Circuit did not fully analyze. For instance, as Judge
Hawkins pointed out in his dissent, the actual holding in Smith is that
"the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obliga-
tion to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).", 126 After pointing this out, Judge
Hawkins correctly concluded that the hybrid language in Smith was
"dicta; simply an attempt to distinguish other free exercise cases from
the facts in Smith. ' 127 As dicta, the hybrid rights language has never
been binding on any court, while the "neutral, generally applicable"
language is binding on all federal courts.
The Thomas court claimed that it would not "speculate or
hypothesize about the Justices' true intentions. "128 However, the
stated intention of the Justices was to establish the "neutral, generally
applicable" rule as the law of the land.
The Sixth Circuit, acting in accord with Justice Souter, pro-
claimed hybrid rights to be "completely illogical, 1 29 holding, that
until the Supreme Court required otherwise, the Sixth Circuit would
not apply a stricter standard than was employed in Smith.13 ° The
Sixth Circuit properly recognized that the hybrid rights language was
not binding and chose instead to follow the true holding of Smith. For
the Ninth Circuit to characterize this analysis as the Sixth Circuit's
124. Id. at 704.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 723 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 705.
129. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
130. Id.
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having thrown "up its hands in despair" '31 is "simply wrong. ' 132 In
fact, the Sixth Circuit based its opinion of hybrid rights on the very
same premise that the Ninth Circuit relied upon. That is, that the
Supreme Court was vague in regard to the precise nature of hybrid
rights. 133  For instance, the Supreme Court has never affirmatively
stated that the Smith rule contains a hybrid rights exception.'34 In
addition, the Supreme Court has never said what the ramifications
would be if a hybrid right was found to exist. The Sixth Circuit pro-
claimed, "until the Supreme Court holds that the legal standards
under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending upon whether other
constitutional rights are implicated, we will not," vary from the actual
Smith holding. 135
This is a very important issue. Even if there is a hybrid rights
exception, the Supreme Court has never indicated whether that auto-
matically means that the Free Exercise hybrid claim will be tested
under strict scrutiny. Furthermore, when the Supreme Court has had
an opportunity to clarify itself, it has declined to do so136
If the original Thomas court had undergone this analysis, it could
not have found that a hybrid rights exception to the Smith rule exists.
However, as lower courts are wont to do, the Ninth Circuit may have
simply been anticipating what the Supreme Court might do in the
same situation, regardless of what is or is not binding. As the Thomas
court pointed out, Smith did not explicitly overrule Sherbert and its
progeny; it simply distinguished them into submission. 137 This, the
court might have argued, lends itself to the possibility that a hybrid
rights exception might exist. The issue therefore becomes this: absent
an affirmative holding by the Supreme Court that a hybrid rights
exception really does exist, can a lower court infer that the Supreme
Court meant to establish one?
There are several clues that evidence against such a conclusion.
First, as has been discussed above, the Supreme Court has never taken
the opportunity to clarify its position on the matter. If the Court felt
that hybrid rights should be the new rule for constitutional free exer-
cise analysis, one would assume that the Justices would choose to state
so affirmatively. Furthermore, Justice Souter's scathing indictment of
131. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704.
132. Id. at 723 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 703.
134. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566-68
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
135. Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180.
136. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520.
137. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704.
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Smith's hybrid rights language is indicative of at least one Justice's
view that hybrid rights are "ultimately untenable."'38
Furthermore, the author of the Smith opinion, Justice Scalia,
seems not to believe in the existence of hybrid rights. In the same year
that Smith was handed down, Scalia wrote, "[o]ne will search in vain
the document we are supposed to be construing for text that provides
the basis for the argument over these distinctions; and will find no
hint that the distinctions are constitutionally relevant."' 39 After all,
there is no hybrid right in the Constitution. As one commentator put
it,
[w]hen one receives news that a two hundred year old Constitu-
tion has given birth to a new legal creature, it is wise to be skep-
tical. Even more so when the herald angels announce that the
attending midwife was none other than Justice Antonin Sca-
lia... It is simply incorrect to say... that Smith begat a
heretofore unheard of legal claim.'40
Even if the Ninth Circuit could have found a way to overlook the
interpretive difficulties involved in hybrid rights, and even if it could
have found that Justice Scalia really did intend to create a new consti-
tutional bundle of rights, it would still have been left with the problem
of deciding which hybrid rights standard to apply. Declaring the col-
orable claim standard to be "just right"'' was a mischaracterization in
that the court failed to recognize the logical problems inherent in that
standard. Just as with the implication standard, the colorable claim
standard allows a party to join losing free exercise claims with other
losing claims to create a winning free exercise claim.
Furthermore, this standard comes down to an essentially ad hoc
factual review by the lower courts. Because companion claims need
not rise to the level of being independently viable under this analysis,
it will be the trial court, rather than the jury, that decides some very
important factual issues in a 'colorable claim' free exercise hybrid case.
The Ninth Circuit skirts this issue by simply declaring that it believes
that "any hybrid rule's administrability must play second fiddle to its
consistency with Supreme Court precedent."' 42 Evidently the court
was not concerned with Supreme Court precedent involving the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial.
138. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567.
139. Cf. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
140. James R. Mason, III, Comment, Smith's Free-Exercise "Hybrids" Rooted in Non-Free-
Exercise Soil, 6 REGENT U.L. REV 201, 226-27 (1995).
141. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 707.
142. Id. at 706.
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Because the Ninth Circuit did not undertake an independent
analysis of whether the Supreme Court really did create a hybrid
rights exception to the Smith rule, it had to choose between three
standards, each of which entails, "certain logical and interpretive diffi-
culties." '143 With these three to choose from, the court picked the
lesser of three evils. However, it would have been far more prudent to
have conducted a rigorous examination into the existence of a hybrid
rights exception, rather than assuming its existence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Smith, lower courts,
commentators, and legislators have attempted to find ways to return to
the rule of Sherbert. Given the tumultuous history of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, this is hardly surprising. Nor is it surprising that the
Ninth Circuit sought to avoid the Smith rule in Thomas. With the
controversy between religious landlords and unmarried cohabitants
continuing to be a topic of commentary and legal battles, the court did
not want to declare that neutral, generally applicable housing laws do
not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
It was a zeal to return to the Sherbert rule that led the Thomas
court down the wrong path. If it had conducted the proper inquiry,
the court would have had no choice but to stand up and loudly
declare, "three losers do not make a winner: there is no such thing as a
'hybrid right."'
When the Ninth Circuit revisits this case en banc, it should be
wary of the pitfalls that led the original Thomas court down the wrong
path. The court should look back at Smith and conduct a rigorous
analysis of Justice Scalia's hybrid-rights dictum. If it does, the court
will have no choice but to conclude that the original Thomas court
simply found something that did not exist.
143. Id. at 704.
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